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Mesopotamian Politics

I. The Argument
The Narrative

Part III
Chapter 12

A Premature Experiment

Marco De Pietri – April 2024

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12.1 The Historical Development

The experiment of the first ‘empire’, i.e. that of Akkad, despite being structured as a well’articulated ideology was premature in time, even if not at all ephemeral: in fact, it lasted for more than four generations (see Table 3), about a century and a half, from Sargon (2334-2279 BC) to Shar-kali-sharri (2217-2193 BC); this ‘empire’ was then followed by ca. 40 years of ‘post-imperial’ period.

To face another similar structure, it took ca. 15 centuries, with the Neo-Assyrian empire (Table 6; cf. Section 21) which lasts for not that long (911-627 BC). The model of the first ‘empire’ was kept, despite a slight difference: the changing of the center of gravity of the political structure; in effect, the new empire extended much widely, reaching areas outside the proper Syro-Mesopotamian core (compare the extention of the ‘empire’ of Akkad to that of the Neo-Assyrian empire).

It is worthy to trace two remarks:

  1. the radical transformations set in place by the ‘empire’ of Akkad remained operative; anyway, the ‘empire’, represented the end of the city-state (see following section; for the city-state, cf. Section 6.1)
  2. new disintegrating forces affected the structure of the state which became vulnerable (cf. below, sections 12.3-6).

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12.2 The Legacy

It is important to enucleate here some elements of the legacy left by the first ‘imperial’ experiment:

  1. the para-perceptual relationship with the territory;
  2. the ‘explosion’ of the horizons;
  3. the heterogeneity of the ‘empire’, including different populations;
  4. the organicism of the ‘empire’ ecumene;
  5. the aggregative potential the the ‘empire’ conceived as a ‘multi-regional’ entity;
  6. the structural consolidation of the political ‘imperial’ structure (cf. Sections 9.4-6) characterized by:
    • a new strategical projectuality, perceiving the whole in its totality;
    • a new tactical view, implying specific organizational skills which involved both the administration and the military system.

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12.3 Structural Fragility

Seen through the lens of the directionality of the process, during the first ‘imperial’ period, everything came from the top (in a top-down approach)Note 1: this led to the fact that the Sumerian and Amorite components of the new political entity did not feel themselves as a part of the whole; a very clear clue of fragility which ended in endemic ‘revolts’.

This phenomenon of detachment of the population (or, at least, part of it) from the apex of the ‘imperial’ structure led to a reflux of the original territorial reality (cf. Sections 6 and 7).

Even in the ‘imperial’ period, we can see that some centers, like Urkesh/Tell Mozan, which remained independent, despite their formal inclusion into the ‘empire’; in the case of Urkesh, being this city a central point for the copper trade, Naram-Sin gave a daughter of him, Tar’am-Agade, in marriage to the king of Urkesh (cf. Section 9.8).Note 2

In this last case and some others (cf. Section 9.8), the ‘imperial’ ideology evolved into a new very effective and productive formula, that of the inter-dynastic marriage, which will be very common in the so-called ‘international period’ (cf. Section 17.6).

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12.4 The Retaliation of the Frontier

With the inclusion of heterogenous territories, like the steppe, into the ‘empire’ of Akkad, the ‘imperial genius’ also fostered the formation, as an ineludible counter-effect, of some ‘counter-states’ (cf. Sections 11.3-4).

The ‘original sin’ of the first ‘imperial’ experiment consisted in beeing incapable of fully integrate the new components (mostly, the Sumerian cities and the Amorites) into te whole of the ‘imperial’ system: this represented indeed an element of structural fragility with a potential (and actual) negative impact.

In effect, an impulse against the ‘empire’ came from the mountains of the northeast; in the end, the Gutians (attested mainly in Sumerian sources) caused the collapse of the ‘empire’ of Akkad. Later on, king Utu-hegalNote 3 of Uruk (around 2100 BC) claimed to have expelled the Gutians,Note 4 who are described as “the viper of the mountains, the enemy of the gods, stole and brought to the mountains the kingship of Sumer and filled Sumer with evil”Note 5 (of course, this proclaim has to be intended as a political declaration).

Thus, the Gutians were perceived as an extraneous entity, even if well-defined, and they were “easily […] demonized as the principal cause of the catastrophe” (Buccellati, Origins, p. 160); in fact, the raids of the Gutians (described in the aforementioned text as ‘barbarians’) were seen as directly addressed against the heart of the ‘motherland’ and not just against Akkad.

In fact, the later Sumerian identity (cf. Section 14.2), radically modified by the experience of Akkad, was shaped in contrast and in opposition to the external ethnic entity of the Gutians: “the attack from beyond the frontier triggered a concept of the state that was more reductive but also more solid than the explosion of the boundaries accomplished by the empire” (Buccellati, Origins, p. 160).

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12.5 The Illusion of the Ecumene

The frontier basically did not last because, indeed, it was not a frontier and the established ‘ecumene’, since also entities outside the ‘empire’ were, in fact, inhabited, was not at all a provileged, inviolable region.

The external ecumene became much more important: the political ideology of the ‘empire’ of Akkad (which tempted to secure its ‘natural’ borders) was, in effect, an ‘illusion’.

The political and cultural impact of the external ecumene is particularly evident in the experience of the Amorites (cf. Section 16.8).

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12.6 Climatic Changes

A concomitant event which probably affected Akkad, contributing to its decline (reducing the productive agricultural capacity of the ‘empire’, mostly in the northern area based on rainfall), has been detected in recent times to a general period of drought.

Nevertheless, two point leading to a reduction of importance of this climatic change must be clearly pointed out (cf. also Issar & Zohar 2007 Climatic, Issar & Zohar 2013 Climate, Butzer 1995 Environmental, and Liverani 2018 Paradiso, ch. 2.2):

  1. it was not a global phenomenon affecting the whole area of Akkad;
  2. the very reason for the collapse of Akkad must be retraced in the nature itself of the ‘imperial experiment’ (cf. Section 9) characterized (cf. above) by an internal structural fragility exacerbated by two main aspects:

These were, in a nutshell, the actual reasons for the deterioration of the ‘empire’ of Akkad, conditions made more severe by the climatic situation, which has to be regarded as a secondary factor.

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Notes

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