Giorgio Buccellati 2012 Trinità
Buccellati 2012 Trinità
La Trinità in un'ottica mesopotamica,
Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 1, pp. 24-48
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Extended summary of Buccellati 2012 Trinità
The present contribution, stemming from a conference given in November 2011 at the Catholic University of Milan, investigates the concept of the Trinitarian aspect within the theological, historical, and philosophical background of ancient Mesopotamian culture. This comparison may seem odd, and the author explains the reasons of such an enquiry under three points (pp. 29-30):
- the theological aspect hidden behind the concept of Trinity is strictly linked to fundamental and universal characteristics of the human spirit: thus, any theological issue needs to face this peculiar conception of the divine sphere;
- the historical aspect concerns Mesopotamia as the cradle where the Biblical tradition grew from: hence, Mesopotamia can be perceived as the background where the Biblical message partially shaped from;
- the philosophical aspect involves the Mesopotamian religion as a kind of matrix (a 'fossil') expressing and representing our contemporary view on the world where our modern thought is still strictly informed by.
In the first part of the contribution, the author explains the diversity between polytheism and monotheism is much more complex that what we could think: polytheism expresses a richness in spirituality which must be understood in its own original nature.
In the second part of the paper, G. Buccellati investigates how the Mesopotamian religiosity led to a clear and mere perception of the absolute.
In the third section, the ‘Trinitarian implications’ of this Mesopotamian view are enlightened, dismantling any contraposition and underlining how this ‘non-conflictual dynamics’ led to a sublimation of the notion of ownership, reaching a connection with the notion of ‘gift and communion’.
The author concludes: The idea derived from Mesopotamia is therefore indicative of the fact that the continuity and coherence of human experience comes to our aid when we try to understand our reality today, to understand the motivation behind the altars still erected today to the unknown gods. […] It is therefore up to us, if Christians, to reveal the nature of the desire behind the altar. It is a remote and perennial desire, and the study of aspirations and intuitions of the past must serve to galvanize our conscience as scholars and men. Bending over the factuality of the past and tracing its history must help us regain the vitality of the great clashes and spiritual confrontations found in it, and convey its deepest meaning, as well as when we try to discover the sense of an epochal transformation in the perception of the absolute (pp. 47-48).
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Excerpts from Buccellati 2012 Trinità
NOTE: in the excerpts, the headings are given by the author of the present page.
Polytheism and monotheism | pp. 31-32 | Polarity between polytheism and monotheism 1. Polytheism and monotheism 1.1. The great polarity Let us therefore begin with an in-depth consideration of the polarity between polytheism and monotheism. Monotheism appears at a relatively late date. This results not only from the documentation that we actually have, but also from the self-perception of the first monotheistic tradition, that of the Old Testament. It is because of this chronological posteriority that a derivation of one from the other in time is generally assumed. Monotheism is thus conceived as a stage in the evolution of polytheism: the notion of a single god would be the result of a progressive crystallization, whereby the many personifications of the divine would eventually be combined into a single unit. Conceptually, this actually means that monotheism is nothing more than a polytheism of one. Essential constrast In this way, that irreducible and essential contrast is not recognized which instead exists, in my view, between the two conceptions. This does not mean that there is no historical relationship between the two, because monotheism did not jump out of nowhere, as if from a void, but is instead situated in relation to the previous polytheistic tradition. Its beginning is located in the reality documented in Syrian-Mesopotamia at the turn of the third and second millennium, if one accepts the substantial historical reality of the patriarchal traditions. But the precise dating of the moment of origin matters little for our current argument, because it is quite certain that in any case biblical monotheism is much more recent than polytheism. However, if we cannot consider monotheism as a rarefaction of polytheism it is because of the structural contrast that emerges in a completely coherent way in every stage of the tradition. This contrast, and consequent logical irreducibility, stands out clearly when we consider the way in which both approach the problem of the relationship between absolute and relative. The absolute in polytheism In polytheism, the absolute is seen as an accumulation, the sum of one totality of countable fragments. We can say that the relative is inserted right into the heart of the absolute almost as if to be sublimated by it. It is the juxtaposition of the relative elements, of all the relative elements of reality that constitutes the absolute. The concept of totality rises to the role of criterion to define the very nature of the absolute, so that the relationship between relative and absolute is resolved in terms of inclusion. In this light, we can appreciate how the multiplicity of the figures of the deities responds to a desire for organization of these fragments, and is so much more than a "cast of characters" which are only part of a fantastic drama. The absolute in monotheism In monotheism, however, the absolute is accepted as a different way of reality, which does not allow for numbering. The relative is therefore radically opposed to the absolute, without the slightest possibility of inclusion. However vast and complete it may be, the totality of the elements does not constitute the absolute, because it remains a jumble of fragments. Thus the relationship between relative and absolute is resolved in terms of exclusion. [English translation from Italian by mDP]. |
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