Angelo Brelich 1976 Prolegomeni
Brelich 1976 Prolegomeni
Prolegomeni a una storia delle religioni,
in Puech, Henri-Charles (ed.), Storia delle religioni. I. L'Oriente e l'Europa nell'antichità. Tomo primo,
Roma-Bari: Laterza, pp. 1-55
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ToC of Brelich 1976 Prolegomeni
Table of Contents |
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General topic(s) of the book |
For more than a century – to be precise since the publication of the first great works of F. Max Müller – the history of religions or the comparative history of religions has been regarded as one scientific discipline among others. Even today, however, it does not seem that the existence and raison d'être of this discipline are in themselves a matter of fact, just as, for example, classical philology, the history of literature, linguistics, Egyptology or other humanities. The organization of studies at secondary level does not involve the teaching of the history of religions in any country, whereas the history of literature, philosophy or art is studied everywhere alongside political history. The university chairs devoted to this subject are equally scarce and the specialized periodics that deal with this topic can be counted on the fingers of one hand. This situation reflects the widespread uncertainty – if not explicit skepticism – about the theoretical foundation or the practicability of the history of religions as an autonomous discipline. In theory, an autonomous scientific discipline – or rather: relatively autonomous, since no discipline is absolutely autonomous (classical philology makes use, for example, of linguistics, paleography, ancient history, etc. and vice versa) – is founded to the extent that its object and methods have their own specificity and cannot be confused with those of any other discipline. This elementary observation is sufficient to pose a series of rather complex problems, which will precisely constitute the subject of these prolegomena (from Preface, p. 3; English translation by mDP). |
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Extended summary of Brelich 1976 Prolegomeni
This introduction to the volume Storia delle religioni. I. L’Oriente e l’Europa nell’antichità. Tomo primo, focuses on the definition of some basic aspects of the methodology behind a scientific comparative history comparison of religions.
Chapter 1 displays the basic question: What is religion?. The author stresses at the very beginning how the comparative history of religions, as many others, needs a deontological definition and a clear field of investigation, in this case, the term/concept of ‘religion(s)’. Nevertheless, the very same concept of ‘religion’ is elusive in its definition: in fact, it can be perceived as a mixing of philosophical and social beliefs, of ‘fantastic’ elements, of feelings and different practices. Other scholars, as Benedetto Croce did, negated a specific ontology of religion, relegating it under the sphere of logic or morality. On the other hand, Rudolf Otto, recognised the autonomy of the religious phaenomenon, identifying its peculiarity under the transcendental concept of ‘sacred’. Furthermore, other scholars recognised religion as a universal human phaenomenon, embedded in the human nature (defining the human being as a homo religious), stating the existence of an ‘innate religion’ expressed in different (phenomenological) forms. Notwithstanding, the historical investigation on religion(s) needs to be based on actual evidence, i.e. the different historical manifestation of religion, avoiding any presupposition on innatism (a theory more linked to neuropsychology than to history or comparative studies): «Historical reality knows only the multiplicity of religions and not ‘the religion’, founded on either the transcendent or ‘human nature’ or psychological ‘laws’» (p. 6; English translation by mDP).
As a matter of fact, ancient pre-classical cultures (but also Greeks and Romans) did not retain a specific word for ‘religion’: in the so-called ‘primitive religions’, religion itself is manifested in minimal details of the daily life (such as food, attire, disposition of houses, relationships with relatives and foreigners, economic activities, etc.). Also for the so-called ‘superior religions’ (such as those of Mesopotamia and Egypt), religion was primarily perceived under the real of myths and festivals or other practices (such as the cult and the funerary customs).
Brelich analyses the concept of religious beliefs: since a general definition could be misleading, the author suggests to identify in each singular society the specificity of its religious thoughts, not under a theoretical perspective, but by analysing their peculiar cultural contexts. He also presents the supernatural beings, starting from the pre-historical societies, where spirits were identified in nature, moving to more complex cultures, where people developed a pantheon (or even different pantheons), splitting these supernatural beings under a strict hierarchy, such as dividing gods from demons or semi-gods/heroes (nevertheless, it must be noted that in many societies the difference between gods and demons is very slippery, as in the case of Mesopotamian or Egyptian ‘demons’ [on this second topic, cf. Lucarelli 2010 Demons]).
Another sphere where religious beliefs can be retraced is mythology; in many cultures, myths imply common traits: a) they describe a primordial situation; b) they report events that occurred in a situation very different from the present one; c) these events lead to a formation or transformation of someone or something (p. 23). Rituals represent another useful sphere for the definition of religious thoughts: sometimes they are addressed to worship gods or ancestors, sometimes they are rites of passage (such as a new birth, weddings, treaties of peace, a declaration of war, or death). Other religious phenomena can be indicative of a specific religious thought: it is the case of the taboos (such as food interdictions) or of sacrifices; in both the instances, the human beings establish a relation with the sacred sphere (in the first case dealing with or avoiding something which is ‘sacred’, i.e., non-human).
Chapter 2 moves to another question: What is the history of religions?. After a presentation of different opinions or definitions of this topic, the author concludes with a basic methodological statement: the only way to conduct a proper and effective history of religions is to consider and analyse any specific religion in its cultural and historical milieu.
All in all, this contribution helps in defining the concept of ‘religion’ in ancient times, stressing how superimpositions of modern terminology can be misleading and must therefore be avoided in the historical and comparative analysis of ancient religious systems. The definition of ancient ‘religion’ is outlined by the author of the base on its actual manifestations and representations, a topic often discussed by Giorgio Buccellati (see e.g. When on High…, Chapter 4).
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Excerpts from Brelich 1976 Prolegomeni
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Feasts
Feasts | p. 30 | That the religious act also has the purpose of protecting the indispensable «profane» action is what is equally apparent from other religious institutions. The concentration of the «sacred» on certain «parts» of reality (otherwise it would be widespread everywhere) is one of the functional elements of the delimitation of sacred places and sacred time. The «feast» – and even more so, every party – certainly has specific functions; all feasts, for example, also represent an interruption of profane time, that is to say a contact with the «ahistorical time» of the origins, a re-immersion in that time, an elimination of the usury entailed by historical existence, a resume from the starting point (English translation by mDP). |
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History of religions
History of religions | pp. 36, 54-55 | The study of religious facts is certainly not the only one that can highlight the insufficiency of research confined to the study of a single civilization, but it appears particularly significant in this regard, so much so as to justify the autonomy of the «history of religions» as a specific discipline. [...] The future of the history of religions does not however depend on these conditions, common to all the historical disciplines, but on the acquisitions and diffusion of the specific methodological awareness required by this discipline. It is not a bad thing that the historian of religions limits his field of research to a single religion, that of which he is able to know the cultural environment well, from the philological, archaeological point of view, etc. But what is important is that he studies a given religion as a historian of religions and not as a historian of the corresponding civilization; that his problems and his method are those of the history of religions; method, we have seen, essentially comparative, even if in the comparison every scholar must rely on the research of his colleagues specialized in other historical and philological sectors, but equally historical of religions. We are not at this point yet! The study of individual religions is essentially carried out within the framework of the study of individual civilizations; at most, eminent Celtic scholars may specialize in the study of Celtic religions, while Assyriologists specialize in Mesopotamian religions. But when what today is still a sporadic phenomenon will become more frequent, when historians of religions, aware of the problems and methodology of their discipline, starting from this, will necessarily specialize in specific philological sectors in order to insert the religion studied in the history of religions conceived as an autonomous discipline, the situation will change; the variety of tools will no longer hinder the use of a common language, a common problematic and a common methodology, so that the same understanding, sought in common, will become more and more certain and better and better founded. The history of religions in this way will acquire ever more solid and broader foundations, beyond the necessarily limited work of each individual scholar (English translation by mDP). On this topic, cf. section 6. History of the Discipline (by Jonah Lynch). |
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Myths
Myths | p. 21 | These are narratives that were originally transmitted orally and, in some higher civilizations, have been recorded in sacred books or also inserted in «profane» contexts; they are considered to be true, certainly not because they have been verified or at least probable, but for religious reasons. This is what we can say for the moment. We call these tales by convention «mythical», using a term derived from ancient Greek, where mythos originally meant nothing more than a story (English translation by mDP). |
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Other religious phenomena
Other religious phenomena | pp. 27-28 | The identity of the ultimate reasons for rites, beliefs in superhuman beings and myths would certainly be sufficient in itself to demonstrate the fundamental homogeneity of the sphere of religious manifestations. But this similarity is also confirmed by the analysis of other types of religious phenomena. A religion, in fact, is not only made up of beliefs in superhuman beings, myths and ritual practices (English translation by mDP). |
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Religion
Religion | pp. 4, 13, 33 | Does the history of religions have its own specific object? Apparently the answer is simple: yes, of course, and the object is precisely constituted by the religions whose history it studies. However, it has often been asked whether «religion» itself is an autonomous phenomenon, with precise distinctive features compared to other cultural phenomena. Is not religion a heteroclite mixture of philosophical and social doctrines, of fantastic elements, of the feelings and practices of the majority, disparate? The time when it was claimed that religion was nothing more than a rudimentary science, anticipating, in the course of the development of humanity, the formation of the sciences proper is not yet completely overcome; in a contemporary era, Benedetto Croce denied religion recognition as an autonomous «category», considering it a simple by-product of the categories of «logic» and «moral» [...] What, then, distinguishes religious belief from profane belief? It does not seem to be the nature of its object: one can in fact believe even profanely in the existence of God and in the immortality of the soul (on the basis of philosophical deductions, for example). The best way to tackle the problem is probably to analyze some types of religious beliefs, not in the abstract but in their respective cultural contexts [...] Religion is probably only one of the possible answers to the human condition, because it depends on it according to a link of «cause and effect». Unlike physics, the history of humanity and culture do not know rigid laws of causality, but only flexible probability relationships between certain types of situations and certain types of reactions on the part of human societies [cf. also below, about a "negative" definition of religion] (English translation by mDP). |
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Representatives
Representatives | p. 31 | In societies with a more legal system hierarchical and better articulated, each social unit will have its own «representative» in front of the others, and society as a whole may have a leader who represents it in front of other companies. Generally, the «representative» is also entrusted with the task of fulfilling the «religious» obligations in the name of the whole group. When it happens that this figure has collected in himself too many offices to be able to hold them, he can in turn delegate other people to perform certain functions (for example, command in wartime, the supervision of the herds, the administration of justice or, precisely, activities of a sacred nature): it is in this direction that the origin of the institution of «priesthood» must be sought. The case is different when the group entrusts the duties of a sacred nature not to its natural representative (or to a delegate of the latter) but to people who demonstrate a particular «calling» to deal with powers and beings «superhumans» (sorcerers, shamans, etc.). The result obtained by the community, however, is the same: partly released from its religious obligations, it remains free to devote itself to its profane activities, while remaining guaranteed as regards the maintenance of relations with the «sacred» (English translation by mDP). |
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Rites
Rites | p. 25 | As long as they fall within the «cult» of superhuman beings, that is, within the stable relationships established with these beings and elevated to the rank of institutions, rites do not pose new problems, since such superhuman beings «exist» (i.e. they believe in their existence) by virtue of relationships established with them, relationships of which the cult represents the most complete stable form. Addressing prayers to a superhuman being means, first of all, attributing to him an existence, the ability to come into contact with man, a willingness to act according to his wishes; this also explains prayers that do not contemplate supplication, such as the hymn or other forms of pure exaltation of superhuman beings (especially deities), whose characteristics they fix in accordance with the needs of men. Certain types of «sacrifice» are based on the necessity of these relationships, which aim either to involve the superhuman being in the circuit of gifts and exchanges or to establish a pact with him, a community of interests, a solidarity or even, in the extreme form of «communion», an identification. For various religious conceptions, even for those that are far from being considered «primitive», superhuman beings require a cult: it is the perfect form of the projection of man's need for the existence of these same beings and to see their behavior determined by them (English translation by mDP). |
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Sacrifices
Sacrifices | pp. 29-30 | Among the different ritual actions, quite heterogeneous, commonly indicated with the term «sacrifice», there is a very clearly distinct type, which can be defined as «primitial offer». It is the ritual surrender to superhuman beings of a part of what is to be consumed. This ritual act is based on the unconscious belief that everything that surrounds man in the world is essentially non-human, that is, belongs to non-human beings. Penetrating into this «sacred» world, which does not belong to him, in order to satisfy such needs and taking possession of things that are part of this world, man has the sensation of committing sacrilege (a phenomenon that is particularly evident in civilization devoted to hunting); the sacrilege would become irremediable the moment he consumed the first piece of his booty (or even of what he produced, if he believes that this does not entirely belong to him); to escape this danger, man tries to evade it by offering the first piece, or the «first fruits», to the true non-human owner, in order to acquire in this way the right to continue in consumption, using the «rest» [cf. also Actemeier et al. 1996 Harper] (English translation by mDP). |
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Superhuman beings
Superhuman beings | p. 14 | To summarily characterize this type of superhuman beings we will immediately say that it inhabits uninhabited spaces; these, on the one hand, are opposed to fields or villages, where everything is governed and protected by the human rules of social life, but, on the other hand, they represent the world where the hunter and the gatherer are forced to procure the means of subsistence [note as food is in a way often connected to religion and religious practices (note by mDP)]. The role more manifest of the being in question is to grant or refuse game to the hunter; it is in his power to hide it from him, condemning the human group to starvation, but he can also make the hunter succeed, that is, make available to him the magical means that will ensure the happy outcome of an enterprise vital to him. As a representative of the «non-human» (of the «uninhabited»), this type of being is monstrous and, due to its close links with game, it is often represented with a partially theriomorphic aspect (English translation by mDP). |
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Taboos
Taboos | p. 28 | The rites are singular actions limited in time; but permanent activity, the entire constant behavior of the individual and of the group can also be subject to conditioning of a «religious» order. Think, for example, of the vast category of phenomena – which are rather heterogeneous – which is usually designated by the Polynesian term of «taboos». These are interdictions, sometimes imposed by an authority («sacred» leaders, priests, individuals with a particular power), sometimes traditional and with an unknown origin, sometimes temporary, other permanent, valid in certain cases for all in others exclusively for certain specific groups (depending on age, sex, clan, caste, etc.), relating both to objects (which should not be looked at or touched, or, in the case of food, ingest), both to certain relationships (for example, incest), and finally to some places or certain words («lexical taboos») (English translation by mDP). |
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