Giorgio Buccellati 1981 Wisdom
Buccellati 1981 Wisdom
“Wisdom and Not: The Case of Mesopotamia”,
Journal of the American Oriental Society 101/1, pp. 35-47
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Excerpts from Buccellati 1981 Wisdom
NOTE: in the excerpts, the headings are given by the author of the present page.
| Religion | pp. 36-37 | Definition of religion A. RELIGION. Religion is an institution which may be said, briefly, to regulate the relationship between man and the absolute. One pivotal point in this relationship is the very concept of the absolute. In this respect there is in Mesopotamian thought an interesting dichotomy. On the one hand, we have an open system which we call the pantheon, a kaleidoscopic repertoire of divinities who personify various aspects of reality. This system is "open" in the specific sense that any variation is possible: as new aspects are perceived, new divinities may be added and the necessary adjustments made (e.g. the curtailment or abolition of the prerogatives of other deities). But even if open, it remains a system, and it is its overall integrity as a sytem which reflects an acceptable statement about the absolute. Acceptable – and not. The corollary intrinsic in a polytheistic system is that the components of the system, the gods, place limits on each other; and hence underscore by their very existence a dimension of relativity within a system which tends to proclaim the absolute. Accordingly, we find in Mesopotamia, as a counterpart of the polytheistic system, a closed system which views the absolute as being above internal variation. The concept and meaning of fate This alternative perception of the absolute is first of all apparent in the case of a specific concept, that of fate. It had not yet come to be fully elaborated in the Mesopotamian context; yet it appears to be well defined, and may be juxtaposed in several ways to the polytheistic system. Fate is not a god because it is not the personification of any single aspect of reality, and as such it does not enter into a one-to-one relationship with either the gods (he is not a protagonist in any myth) or man (there is no prayer or hymn to fate). And yet fate belongs to the divine sphere because it conditions divine action as an ultimate referent – more divine than the gods in its degree of absoluteness, and yet lacking the personal dimension the gods exhibit. (It may be argued that Israelite monotheism is the locus where this antinomy is resolved - but this must be left for another occasion.) Of the two systems, the polytheistic one is clearly in major evidence throughout Mesopotamian culture, and it is often seen to subsume within itself the closed system revolving around fate – hence, for instance, in those myths where fate is presented as an object, the tablets of destiny. Divination and reflective literature There are other cases, besides those which make specific reference to fate, where the closed system is dominant at the exclusion of the polytheistic system. This is true especially in two areas. The first is divination; the second, the type of reflective literature represented, for example, by the Theodicy. Divination proclaims in an operational mode the supreme reality of the absolute as perceived through its own immutable laws. Rather than an attempt to bend reality, divination may be viewed as the ability to perceive laws which de facto link the various aspects of reality. Since the gods are themselves subjected to these laws, they have no direct participation in the phenomenon of divination, but appear only as outsiders (e.g., Šamaš as the guardian of justice); and even though fate is not explicitly introduced, it may be said (perhaps metaphorically) that divination may be considered as the ritual pertaining to fate's causality in human affairs. Similarly, we may say that some of the reflective literature, such as the Theodicy, may be viewed as the correlative of a mythological statement about fate. While not narrative in content, like the myths, these texts nevertheless present a descriptive reflection about the pervasiveness of laws which in their absolute value transcend both the individual gods and the unresolved questions of human life. Thus the Theodicy is not the vindication of a given god or of the open polytheistic system, but rather a statement about the ultimate validity of the absolute, both in the divine (or supernatural) and in the human (or political) sphere (see Buccellati 1972: 163-5). Immanent revelation This finer sensibility for the proper dimensions of the absolute finds a correlative in the particular attitudes which lead man to question and assimilate it more deeply. The texts which deal with the open polytheistic system propound an axiomatic view of the divine world. It can be compared to an immanent revelation, i.e. an obvious reality which makes itself known simply by being there. Transcendent revelation is not unknown. but is limited to the communication of specific messages, rather than being the self-revelation of the divine sphere – examples being the Mari oracles and, from the myths, the messages of Ea to Adapa (in the homonymous myth), of Ea to Utnapishtim (Gilgamesh), of Nergal to Kurrā (Vision of the Netherworld), of Irra to Kabti-ilāni-Marduk (Poem of Irra). Normally, therefore, knowledge of the divine world is simply assumed as obvious, without transcendent revelation and without theological reasoning: the metaphor is the main device to convey, present and describe what is already apparent. In contrast with this, we have texts exhibiting a more inquisitive attitude – and these are the same texts which presuppose a closed system of the absolute. Divination is built on an age-long inquiry into data and their associations (Bottéro 1974): it may be considered true theological speculation, inasmuch as it develops a system of relationships resting on a theory of causality which was clearly perceived, even if not articulated, in a systematic fashion (see especially Starr 1974 and 1980). The Theodicy includes a specific call to reject established religion (the open system), and delves at length into the question of the acceptability of the divine sphere. The Dialog of Pessimism also accepts a refusal of religion, at least on an alternative basis (53-61). Gilgamesh is presented as rejecting given embodiments of the established system (Ishtar, Humbaba) and as setting out on a personal quest in defiance of established norms. The Epic of Gilgamesh The case of Gilgamesh is also paradigmatic in another respect: the process through which his goal is acquired, the experience this represents, is itself the measure of his personal enrichment. This is an important dimension which serves well to differentiate among various types of texts. On the one hand we have a stress on the growth of inner experience as a major goal in life (Gilgamesh, Theodicy, Pessimism), while on the other the stress is on the attainment of externals (Ludlul, hymns, etc.). The latter is the easier scale: the gods are considered as procurers, they are intermediaries to something else which is in reality the main reason for the relationship. The former attitude is more difficult to sustain and to express: the emphasis is placed on experience as experience for its own sake and at the expense of comforts if necessary; but, in religious terms, it does not build on a specific or personal object of experience other than the most abstract and generic values. Such an attitude is, on the side of the interacting subject, the natural correlative of the concept of the absolute as perceived in the closed system described above: since the object of the relationship (whether fate or abstract values) is itself impersonal, the experience which underlies the relationship cannot itself take place at an impersonal level. In this respect, a most interesting text comes from the scientific literature, formulated, as is normally the case in this genre, in omen form – the so-called physiognomatic omina (Starr 1974; Kraus 1936; Krauss 1939): it gives a long series of psychological observations about human psychological behavior, its roots and its manifestations: in terms of religious experience, the text formulates a series of paradigms which will find their echo in the Beatitudes of the Gospels (Buccellati 1972). |